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Blue Skies Ahead: Auction Rate 
Securities and the Need for a 
Private Right of Action for New 
York Investors 
 
Stephanie Myers 
 
The United States‘ failing economy is in the news every 
day.  In response to the economic disaster looming on the 
horizon, the United States government passed a bailout plan.  
The financial industry bears partial blame for the crisis, due in 
part to the risky investments that the firms had backed and 
marketed to investors.  Investments such as Auction Rate 
Securities (―ARS‖) are a prime example, as the market for ARS 
is upwards of $330 billion and it became illiquid as of February 
2008.1  A lay-investor has difficulty understanding this type of 
investment; some might even say that the brokers who sold 
these securities did not fully understand ARS and the way they 
performed in the market. 
This Comment discusses ARS and the settlements that 
securities regulators have reached with various brokerage 
firms in the face of allegations that they misrepresented the 
risks associated with ARS to investors.  The settlements will 
return to liquidity the ARS holdings of tens of thousands of 
customers.  However, not all customers are covered by the 
settlements; those who are not must resort to filing a lawsuit or 
arbitration claim against their brokers and brokerage firms to 
recover their illiquid investments.  For reasons explained 
below, ARS investors will be hard-pressed to bring a successful 
 
 Pace University School of Law, J.D. candidate, 2010.  I would like to 
thank Professor Jill Gross both for her insight into this topic and for her 
continued support and encouragement in all of my endeavors. 
1. See Bank of America in Auction-Rate Securities Settlement, 
PHILADELPHIA BUS. J., Sept. 10, 2008, available at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2008/09/08/daily22.html.  See 
also Melanie Cherdack & Daniel A. Ball, Auction Rate Securities: The New 
Frontier, in PRACTISING LAW INST., CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 335 (2008), available at WL1686 PLI/Corp335. 
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claim under federal securities laws and must therefore rely on 
state securities laws. 
Due to the differing state securities laws, investors in some 
states will likely be able to recover their investments, while 
investors in New York will probably not.  This is due to New 
York‘s unique Martin Act2 and the fact that New York 
investors must rely on common law causes of action as the 
basis for their suits.3  Is it fair that New York investors are at 
such an extreme disadvantage simply because the New York 
State legislature has failed to grant investors a private right of 
action?  This Comment‘s position is that it is unfair; and 
accordingly, seeks to urge the Legislature to adopt a version of 
the Uniform Securities Act of 2002.4  A hypothetical example of 
an entirely unsophisticated investor, Sarah, a New York 
resident who inherited a substantial sum of money from a 
family member and is convinced by a broker to invest the 
money in ARS, demonstrates the need for such a statute.  If 
Sarah were a resident of almost any other state instead of New 
York, she would likely recover her investment.  However, as a 
resident of New York, she will presumably have little recourse. 
 
I.  Auction Rate Securities 
 
A. Background5 
 
―Auction-rate securities are variable-interest rate, long-
term securities that were marketed to individual, retail 
investors and institutional investors as cash equivalents by 
many of Wall Street‘s leading financial institutions.‖6  Cash 
equivalents are investments many consider to be ―liquid,‖ 
 
2. See generally N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352-359-h (McKinney 1996). 
3. See discussion infra Part III(A). 
4. See generally UNIF. SEC. ACT (2002). 
5. See generally STEPHANIE LEE, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, AUCTION-
RATE SECURITIES: BIDDER‘S REMORSE? A PRIMER 10 (2008), available at 
http://www.mmc.com/knowledgecenter/NERA_PUB_Auction_Rate_Securities.
pdf (―The first ARS was registered by American Express in July 1984.  The 
instrument was conceived by Ronald Gallatin, managing director of new 
product development in the Lehman Brothers Unit of Shearson 
Lehman/American Express.‖). 
6. Sean T. Seelinger, Auction-Rate Securities: A Fast & Furious Fall, 13 
N.C. BANKING INST. 287, 287 (2009). 
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meaning investors may sell them very easily.7  Investors were 
tempted by ARS because the securities typically paid a higher 
yield than other ―liquid‖ investments.8 
 
There generally are two types of ARS, bonds with 
long-term maturities (20 to 30 years) and 
preferred shares with a cash dividend.  Both the 
interest on the bonds and the dividend on the 
preferred shares are variable based on rates that 
are set through auctions for a specified short 
term usually measured in days—7, 14, 28, or 35.9 
 
B. Dutch Auctions 
 
Holders of ARS have several choices before each auction: 
investors can choose to hold their current position at a specified 
rate, sell their ARS, or hold their ARS at the newest prevailing 
rate established at auction.10  The issuers of the ARS hold 
dutch auctions, which are: 
 
[O]pen bidding process[es] in which the issuers 
announce[ ] [their] intention[s] to offer a fixed 
quantity of shares and solicit[ ] bids from 
investors who are interested in participating.  
Each potential investor submits a bid specifying 
how many shares he or she is willing to buy and 
at what price, and these bids become irrevocable 
and binding at the close of the bidding period.11 
 
7. See The SEC’s Recent Actions With Respect to Auction Rate Securities: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services., 110th Cong. (2008) 
(statement of Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, 
SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts091808lct.htm 
[hereinafter The SEC’s Recent Actions].  See also Eric Dash & Louise Story, 2 
Banks Buying Back Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at C1. 
8. Aaron Pressman, Auction-Rate Securities: How to Get Unstuck, BUS. 
WK., June 2, 2008, at 76. 
9. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Auction Rate Securities: 
What Happens When Auctions Fail, 
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/Bonds/P038207 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
10. Id. 
11. Lucas C. Townsend, Comment, Can Wall Street’s “Global Resolution” 
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The issuer begins by accepting the bids ―with the lowest 
interest or dividend rate . . . first, followed by successively 
higher bids until all the securities available for auction are 
sold.‖12  The last bid determines the ―‗clearing rate,‘ . . . [which 
is the rate that will apply] to all [of] the ARS until the next 
auction.‖13  The auction will fail if there are not enough bids to 
purchase all of the ARS for sale.14 
 
C. Failing Auctions 
 
ARS auctions began failing in February, 2008.15  Prior to 
the failed auctions, ―[t]o maintain liquidity, financial 
institutions bid on their own securities, creating a false sense 
of demand in the minds of investors.‖16  Once the crux of the 
credit crisis hit, however, the demand for ARS declined and the 
firms no longer had sufficient capital to provide supporting 
bids.17  Without the brokerage firms‘ bids, the auctions began 
to fail because there were not enough buyers to purchase all of 
the ARS that were up for sale at each auction.18 
 
Prevent Spinning?  A Critical Evaluation of Current Alternatives, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1121, 1163 (2004). 
12. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. During the week of February 15, 2008, almost 1,000 of the ARS 
failed.  Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, New Trouble in Auction-Rate 
Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at C6.  On February 22, 2008, 258 out of 
386, or 67%, of auctions failed.  Jeremy R. Cooke, Florida Schools, California 
Convert Auction-Rate Debt, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 22, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=awCJRyi5ngcQ&re
fer=us.  This is an overwhelming figure considering the fact that only forty-
four auctions had ever failed between the advent of ARS in 1984 and the end 
of 2007.  Id. 
16. See Seelinger, supra note 6, at 288.  See generally Martin Z. Braun & 
William Selway, UBS Won't Support Failing Auction-Rate Securities, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 14, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid= 
aa0bS7QZqvlk. 
17. See Braun & Selway, supra note 16.  See also Seelinger, supra note 
6, at 295-98 (explaining in detail the economic events leading up to the failed 
auctions). 
18. See Amod Choudhary, Auction-Rate Securities = Auction Risky 
Securities, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 23, 30-31 (2009). 
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When an auction fails, investors do not ―lose‖ their 
investments.  The security is simply illiquid, meaning that the 
money is still invested in the bond or preferred share, but that 
the investor cannot access it.19  As brokers often marketed the 
ARS as liquid, many investors counted on being able to pull out 
of the market at any time when they needed the invested 
money for other purposes.20  When auctions fail, investors 
endure financial hardship because their invested money is not 
available for their use.21  Investors have several options when 
faced with an illiquid ARS: they may hold until there is a 
successful auction, borrow money from the firm using the ARS 
as collateral, sell the security at a loss on a secondary market 
(if one is available), or wait for the investment to mature—
which, in the case of a 20-30 year bond, is an extreme burden 
on the investor.22 
None of the above alternatives are ideal for the average 
investor.  Should the investor choose to wait until a successful 
auction, his or her money will be unavailable and in the market 
for an unspecified amount of time.  While the market is 
illiquid, however, the investor does continue to receive interest 
at the highest ―fail rate.‖23  Borrowing money from the firm is 
also unadvisable.  While the loan may give the investor a 
temporary supply of cash, some loans charge interest rates that 
are higher than the yield the investor would receive on the 
actual ARS.24  Selling on a secondary market could cause the 
investor to lose a large portion of the investment, as the 
illiquidity of the market makes it highly unlikely that buyers 
would be willing to pay a fair value.25  Firms marketed ARS to 
investors as a highly liquid investment, and therefore, most 
 
19. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9. 
20. The SEC’s Recent Actions, supra note 7. 
21. Id. 
22. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9.  Note that for 
customers who can afford to hold an illiquid investment, many ARS are a 
great investment because the fail rates are soaring due to the failed auctions.  
See Anderson & Bajaj, supra note 15. 
23. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9.  A fail rate is 
―an interest rate or dividend set above market rates [that the investor 
continues to receive] for the next holding period—up to any maximum 
disclosed in the offering documents.‖  Id. 
24. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9. 
25. Id. 
5
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investors are unable to wait twenty to thirty years, until the 
security matures in order to have access to their invested 
funds. 
When the $330 billion ARS market froze and became 
illiquid in early 2008 due to failed auctions, investor 
complaints began flooding into federal securities regulators 
such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (―FINRA‖) 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖), as well 
as to state securities regulators.26  Investors claimed that the 
brokerage firms who sold the ARS did not explain the liquidity 
and investment risks associated with the product.27  Regulators 
claimed that ―in late 2007 and early 2008, the firms knew that 
the ARS market was deteriorating, causing the firms to have to 
purchase additional inventory to prevent failed auctions.‖28  
The firms, however, continued to market ARS to customers, 
allegedly knowing that they were not going to have sufficient 
capital in the long-term to continue to provide supporting 
bids.29  Whether or not the firms and individual brokers knew 
of the repercussions that would follow a cessation of supplying 
supporting bids is a question that has yet to be affirmatively 
answered. 
 
II.  ARS Settlements 
 
A. Results of Regulatory Authorities 
 
Due to the large number of ARS investor complaints 
reported to securities regulators, many industry regulators and 
enforcement agencies began investigating the ARS markets 
 
26. The SEC’s Recent Actions, supra note 7.  See also Press Release, Fin. 
Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Announces Agreements in Principle With 
Five Firms to Settle Auction Rate Securities Violations (Sept. 18, 2008), 
available at  http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008/P117019. 
27. See Seelinger, supra note 6, at 288 (explaining that brokers failed to 
disclose to investors that the issuing firms were supplying supporting bids at 
auction, and that without those bids the auctions would likely fail and the 
markets would be in jeopardy).  See also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, 
SEC Finalizes ARS Settlements With Citigroup and UBS, Providing Nearly 
$30 Billion in Liquidity to Investors (Dec. 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-290.htm. 
28. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27. 
29. The SEC’s Recent Actions, supra note 7. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/10
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and the firms‘ roles in the markets‘ illiquidities.  After these 
investigations, the SEC and some state securities regulators 
filed complaints in federal district courts against several large 
firms.30  The allegations related first to the failure of the firms 
to adequately explain the risks associated with ARS to 
investors, and second, to the firms‘ continued selling of ARS to 
investors while knowing that the market was likely to fail if 
the firms discontinued supplying supporting bids.31  Several 
large firms have agreed to settle these charges.  As of 
December 2008, ―[t]he SEC ha[d] announced final ARS 
settlements with Citigroup Global Markets, UBS Financial 
Services and UBS Securities, while FINRA ha[d] reached final 
settlements with WaMu Investments and First Southwest 
Company.32  In 2009, the SEC reached final ARS settlements 
with: Bank of America, RBC, Deutsche Bank and Wachovia.33  
The settlements and agreements vary in principle, but the 
main aspects of each are similar, with each firm neither 
denying nor admitting liability. 
 
B. Citigroup Global Markets Settlement With SEC 
 
This Comment will focus on Citigroup‘s (―Citi‖) final 
settlement as an example.34  The settlement provides 
approximately $7.5 billion in liquidity to Citi customers.35  ―Citi 
 
30. See, e.g., State Sues Schwab Over Auction-Rate Securities, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at B6. 
31. Id. 
32. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Provides 
Details on Special Arbitration Procedures For ARS Consequential Damages 
(Dec. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008/P117557.  See also Press 
Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 26. 
33. The Securities and Exchange Commission website provides links to 
access the complaints and consents pertaining to the ARS settlement it 
reached with each company.  See Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Auction Rate Securities, http://www.sec.gov/investor/ars.htm (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2010). 
34. Citi was the first to settle and its agreement has served as a model 
for other companies.  However, each firm‘s agreement is likely to be slightly 
different in detail.  Actual settlements are of course subject to court approval.  
See Consent Decree, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n v. Citigroup Global Mkts., No. 08 
Civ. 10753, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-290-citiconsent.pdf. 
35. See id.  See also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Citigroup 
7
1116 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
will offer to purchase ARS at par from individuals, charities, 
and small businesses that purchased those ARS from Citi, even 
if those customers moved their accounts.‖36  Eligible customers 
are those who purchased ARS through Citi on or before 
February 12, 2008, and held those securities in a Citi account 
on February 12, 2008.37  The Citi customers who took out a 
loan to satisfy their cash needs will be reimbursed for the 
interest expense that they were forced to pay for the loan, less 
what interest they collected from the underlying ARS.38  ARS 
customers who sold their holdings on a secondary market at a 
loss will be reimbursed for ―the difference between par and the 
price at which the Eligible Customer sold the auction rate 
securities, plus reasonable interest thereon.‖39  Citi is also 
required to find liquidity solutions for other customers whom it 
will not make offers to repurchase the ARS.40  Citi is not 
allowed to make its own ARS investments liquid before it does 
 
Agrees in Principle to Auction Rate Securities Settlement (Aug. 7, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-168.htm.  The UBS 
settlement provided approximately $22.7 billion in liquidity to eligible 
customers who purchased ARS through UBS.  Press Release, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm‘n, supra note 27. 
The following is a list of the firms that have reached agreements in 
principle with the SEC and the amount of ARS they have agreed to buy back 
from their customers: Bank of America, $4.5 billion, see Press Release, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm‘n, Bank of America Agrees in Principle to ARS Settlement (Oct. 
8, 2008), available at http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-247.htm; 
RBC, $800 million, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, SEC Division of 
Enforcement Announces ARS Settlement in Principle with RBC Capital 
Markets, Inc. (Oct. 8, 2008), available at 
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-246.htm; Merrill Lynch, $1.5 
billion, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, SEC Enforcement Division 
Announces Preliminary Settlement with Merrill Lynch to Help Auction Rate 
Securities Investors (Aug. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-181.htm; Wachovia, $9 billion, see 
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Wachovia Agrees to Preliminary 
Auction Rate Securities Settlement that Would Offer Approximately $9 
Billion to Investors (Aug. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.404.gov/news/press/2008/2008-176.htm. 
36. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27. 
37. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 2.  See also Morgan Stanley Smith 
Barney, Auction Rate Securities, Practices and Procedures of Citigroup 
Global Markets Inc., 
https://www.smithbarney.com/products_services/fixed_income/auction_rate_s
ecurities/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
38. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 8-9. 
39. Id. at 9. 
40. Id.  See also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/10
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so for its customers.41 
Some ARS investors turned to the secondary market when 
the auctions began to fail.  The ARS sold for a price lower than 
par value, resulting in a loss to the investor.42  Citi is required 
to reimburse those eligible customers for the difference 
between the par value of the ARS and the value the customer 
actually sold it for.43  When the market froze, many brokerage 
firms began to allow their customers to borrow cash on margin 
to make up for their illiquid investments.44  However, the 
interest rate on those loans may have been higher than the 
rate of return on the underlying ARS.45  Citi now will 
reimburse its customers for the amount of the interest 
payments that exceeded the return on the ARS investment.46  
However, the settlement does not require Citi to reimburse 
customers for any consequential damages47 they may have 
suffered while their investment was illiquid.48 
 
C. FINRA’s Special Arbitration Procedures 
 
When an investor wishes to dispute an action taken by his 
or her brokerage firm, the investor may file a lawsuit or an 
arbitration claim to resolve the discrepancy.  FINRA has 
announced special arbitration procedures for customers 
covered by the ARS settlements that will allow those customers 
to pursue claims for consequential damages.49  Under the 
special procedures, the investor has the option to file for any 
 
41. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 9-10.  See also Press Release, Sec. 
& Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27. 
42. Darrell Preston, Banks Say Auction-Rate Investors Can’t Have 
Money, BLOOMBERG.COM, June 6, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aWaReGVrnTHk.  
See also Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9. 
43. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 9.  See also Press Release, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27. 
44. See Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 9. 
45. See id. 
46. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 8-9.  See also Press Release, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27. 
47. Consequential damages are those ―[l]osses that do not flow directly 
and immediately from an injurious act but that result indirectly from the 
act.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 333 (8th ed. 2004). 
48. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 10-11. 
49. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32. 
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opportunity costs he or she suffered as a result of the market 
becoming illiquid.50  There are several benefits to an investor 
who chooses to file under the special procedures.  The greatest 
advantage is that the ―firms cannot contest liability related to 
the illiquidity of ARS holdings . . . including any claims of 
misrepresentations or omissions by the firm‘s sales agents.‖51  
The firms also may not defend against the consequential 
damages claim by invoking the customer‘s decision to refuse 
the loan that the firm offered him or her prior to the 
settlement.52  The firms are responsible for paying all fees 
associated with the filing of a claim, such as filing fees and 
hearing session fees.53  In addition, the forum will appoint one 
arbitrator to hear consequential damage claims which demand 
less than one million dollars.54  Once the investor proceeds 
under the special arbitration procedures, he or she is barred 
from pursuing a claim for further relief in another forum.55  If 
the investor would like to recover punitive or other damages, 
he or she may choose to file a claim under the standard 
arbitration procedures.56 
 
D. Investors Not Covered by Settlements 
 
While the settlements and special arbitration procedures 
will remedy the harm suffered by some ARS investors, 
―investors that bought from medium-size and online 
brokerages, a.k.a ‗downstream sellers‘ in the secondary market, 
and those that bought structured auction rate notes, are among 
the investors not covered in the regulator‘s settlement.‖57  
Regulators only achieved settlements with the largest, most 
well-known ARS-issuing firms, while many investors 
 
50. Id.  An opportunity cost is ―[t]he costs of acquiring an asset 
measured by the value of an alternative investment that is forgone.‖  BLACK‘S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 295. 
51. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32. 
52. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 11. 
53. See Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32. 
54. See id. 
55. Consent Decree, supra note 34, at 11. 
56. See Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32. 
57. Structured Auction Rate Notes, Downstream Sellers, Consequential 
Damages, Oh My!, http://www.zamansky.com/blog/2008/09/structured-
auction-rate-notes.html (Sept. 5, 2008, 12:36 EST). 
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purchased ARS from smaller brokerage firms that are not 
being pushed by regulators to settle.58  These smaller firms 
defend their selling of ARS by declaring that the issuing firms 
never explained the risks to the brokers who were actually 
selling ARS.59  The ―downstream‖ sellers claim they did not 
know that the issuing firms were controlling the market by 
providing supporting bids.60  Some ARS customer lawyers 
claim that these sellers either knew or purposely shielded 
themselves from discovering the actual risks associated with 
ARS.61  It is not yet clear whether the industry regulators will 
hold downstream sellers responsible for their role in customer 
purchases of ARS.62 
Large institutional and corporate investors are also not 
covered in the ARS settlements.63  With respect to these 
customers, Citi is only required to ―use its best efforts to 
provide liquidity solutions for institutional and other 
customers.‖64  It is questionable whether the settlements will 
cover other groups of investors, such as those who moved their 
ARS accounts between two large firms that settled during the 
time period that the settlements state the person must have 
owned the ARS with the firm.65  For example, a customer who 
purchased the ARS from one broker, but then moved her 
 
58. Liz Rappaport & Shefali Anand, “DownStream” Sellers of Auction-
Rate Securities Balk at Prospect of Buybacks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2008, at 
C3. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Lavonne Kuykendall, Auction-Rate Securities Buy-Back Could Help 
Bond Insurers, MARKETWATCH.COM., Aug. 14, 2008, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/auction-rate-securities-buy-backs-
could-help/story.aspx?guid={00AC3D5A-8CCB-47B3-B1CD-
5B34E1109297}&dist=TQP_Mod_mktwN (―Citi said it will not buy back 
securities owned by larger institutional clients, but will work with the 
securities' issuers and others to provide ‗liquidity solutions‘ for other 
institutional investor clients.‖). 
64. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, supra note 27. 
65. See Gretchen Morgenson, The Investors Who Can’t Come in From the 
Cold, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at BU1 (discussing an example where a 
woman who moved her ARS from UBS to Citi/Smith Barney did not qualify 
under either company‘s settlement eligibility requirements because 
regulators chose the ownership dates based upon when the regulators 
determined that the firm knew of the failing auctions). 
11
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account to Citi, is not an eligible customer under Citi‘s 
settlement.66  These investors must contact the firms through 
which they purchased the ARS to determine if the firms are 
willing to settle or repurchase the ARS.67 
 
E. Repercussions for Those Not Covered 
 
Typically, brokerage firm contracts require their customers 
to forego their right to file a claim in court and specify that any 
dispute must be resolved by arbitration in a dedicated forum, 
such as FINRA.68  Customers who are not eligible under the 
ARS settlements do not receive the benefit of FINRA‘s special 
arbitration procedures.69  This means that these investors‘ only 
recourse is to pursue relief under the standard FINRA 
arbitration rules, which puts investors at a disadvantage when 
compared with the special arbitration procedures.  First, in a 
standard arbitration, the brokerage firms may contest liability 
as to the alleged misrepresentations of ARS risks, as well as 
the illiquidity of the investors‘ ARS holdings.70  Second, the 
investor is required to pay all costs of filing a claim, including 
but not limited to, filing fees and hearing session fees.71  
Arbitration costs may deter some investors from filing a claim, 
as the costs may be very high depending upon the amount of 
the claim and the number of arbitrators assigned to hear it. 
Once in arbitration, the investor may either assert a 
violation of federal or state law as a basis for the cause of 
action.  ARS investors have a potential federal claim against 
their brokerage firms or their individual brokers: investors can 
assert a violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
 
66. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, supra note 37. 
67. Id. 
68. Pre-dispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements became the 
norm in the securities world after the Supreme Court decided, in Shearson v. 
McMahon, that the Securities Exchange Act was subject to enforcement in 
arbitration.  Shearson v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987). 
69. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 32. 
70. Id. 
71. See FINRA CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER 
DISPUTES, Rule 12900(a)(1) (2007), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element
_id=4188.  
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Act of 1934,72 or a violation of the rules that implement the 
statute.73  Typically the two are alleged together as a Section 
10(b) / Rule 10b-5 cause of action.  The Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 makes it 
 
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . 
. [t]o use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.74 
 
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for 
 
any person, directly or indirectly, . . . (a) To 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any 
act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
 
72. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, tit. I, § 10, 48 
Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)). 
73. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (2009).  Although similar in language to Section 10 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see § 10, 48 Stat. at 891, lower federal courts 
are split as to whether or not there is an implied private right of action for 
violations of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 
73-22, tit. I, § 17, 48 Stat. 74, 84-85 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77q 
(2006)).  The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.  For 
a thorough examination of the legislative history surrounding the Acts, as 
well as an argument as to why there is no private right of action, see CPC 
Int‘l, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1987).  But see, e.g., 
Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 
U.S. 909 (1979) (holding that a private cause of action does exist under 
section 17(a)).  See also Choudhary, supra note 18, at 35-44 (examining 
potential federal causes of action for ARS investors). 
74. 48 Stat. at 891. 
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upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.75 
 
Neither the statute nor the rule expressly grants investors 
a private right of action for fraudulent or deceptive practices, 
yet the courts have implied one.76  The elements for a violation 
of either Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 are: ―(1) a material 
misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter . . . ; (3) a 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance . 
. . ; (5) economic loss; and (6) ‗loss causation,‘ i.e., a causal 
connection between the material misrepresentation and the 
loss.‖77  Because the courts have implied a private right of 
action, they strictly require proof of scienter, or intent.78  An 
allegation of negligence will not support a claim for a violation 
of the federal securities acts or rules.79 
The possible federal claims are inadequate for ARS 
investors because the investor will have difficulty proving that 
the brokerage firm or the individual broker had the intent to 
defraud investors, or to misrepresent (or omit) necessary facts 
to enable the investor to make a sound investment decision.  
The element of intent is difficult to prove, especially in the case 
of ARS, where many brokers claim that even they were not 
aware of the risks associated with ARS.  It is improbable that 
in such circumstances an investor would be able to prove the 
necessary element of intent, and therefore the investor will 
likely be unsuccessful with his or her federal claim. 
An ARS investor who proceeds to arbitration with an 
allegation against his or her broker for a violation of either the 
federal securities statute, or rule, will also need to prove the 
element of intent.  If the broker can establish that he or she did 
not fully understand the ARS market, then he or she was at 
most negligent in not providing the investor with sufficient 
investment advice regarding the risks associated with ARS.  A 
finding of negligence will not support a claimant‘s allegation of 
 
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
76. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) 
(examining the legislative history of federal securities legislation). 
77. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) 
(internal citations and emphasis omitted). 
78. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193. 
79. Id. at 214. 
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a violation of federal securities laws and rules, as sciencter, or 
intent, is a necessary element.  In the next section, this 
Comment will address state law that could govern such a 
claim. 
 
III.  State Securities Laws 
 
State securities laws, commonly referred to as blue sky 
laws, vary from state to state.80  The Uniform Securities Act 
(―USA‖), with the most recent version enacted in 2002, has 
helped to reduce the variations between states by providing a 
suggested statutory framework.81  Even among the states that 
have adopted the language of the USA, however, state courts 
continue to apply and interpret the statutes differently.82 
State securities laws, regardless of the version, ―share 
certain features in their approach to prevent sales agents from 
promising unrealistic returns and misinforming investors 
about the investment risks.‖83  Most states require the security 
itself, the issuer, and all brokers to be registered in the state in 
which the securities are being offered for sale.84  The state 
securities acts also contain ―antifraud provisions that create 
liability for any fraudulent statements or failure to disclose 
information as required.‖85  To demonstrate the potentially 
devastating effects that differing state blue sky laws have on 
possible investor claims, the following sections will compare the 
applicable New York law with that of Missouri. 
 
 
80. The origin of the term ―blue sky‖ is unknown.  The first reference to 
the term was in a Supreme Court opinion written by Justice McKenna.  
Justice McKenna, ―us[ing] the language of a cited [though unnamed] case,‖ 
wrote that the phrase ―blue sky‖ refers to ―speculative schemes which have no 
more basis than so many feet of ‗blue sky.‘‖  Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 
U.S. 539, 550 (1917). 
81. See generally UNIF. SEC. ACT (2002). 
82. See Blue Sky Law, Cornell University Law School Legal Information 
Institute, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/blue_sky_law (last visited Feb. 10, 
2010). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
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A. New York’s Martin Act 
 
New York has not adopted the USA, but instead has its 
own securities laws that are contained in the Martin Act 
(―Act‖).86  The Act contains the usual provisions found in other 
state blue sky laws regarding the registration of brokers, 
dealers, salesmen, and securities.87  The difference between 
New York‘s securities laws and those of other states lies in the 
provisions of the Act that deal with fraudulent sales practices 
and deception by brokerage firms and brokers.88  ―The Attorney 
General is vested with the exclusive authority to enforce the 
Martin Act, and is granted various investigatory, regulatory, 
and remedial powers aimed at detecting, preventing, and 
stopping fraudulent securities practices.‖89  The Attorney 
General is not required to ―allege or prove either scienter or 
intentional fraud to establish liability for fraudulent practices 
under the Martin Act‖90  Individual investors, however, do not 
have the same advantages. 
 
 
86. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352-359-h (McKinney 1996). 
87. Id. § 359-e. 
88. Id. § 352-c. 
 
1. It shall be illegal and prohibited for any person, 
partnership, corporation, company, trust or association, or 
any agent or employee thereof, to use or employ any of the 
following acts or practices: (a) Any fraud, deception, 
concealment, suppression, false pretense or fictitious or 
pretended purchase or sale; (b) Any promise or 
representation as to the future which is beyond reasonable 
expectation or unwarranted by existing circumstances; (c) 
Any representation or statement which is false, where the 
person who made such representation or statement: (i) 
knew the truth; or (ii) with reasonable effort could have 
known the truth; or (iii) made no reasonable effort to 
ascertain the truth; or (iv) did not have knowledge 
concerning the representation or statement made . . . . 
 
Id. 
89. Caboara v. Babylon Cove Dev., 862 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div. 
2008).  See also § 352-d. 
90. Caboara, 862 N.Y.S.2d at 538.  See also Martin Act Does Not 
Preclude Common Law Fraud Claim, N.Y. LEGAL UPDATE, Oct. 18, 2007, 
http://www.nylegalupdate.com/2007/10/martin-act-does.html. 
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1.  New York Courts‘ Interpretation of the Martin Act 
 
The New York Court of Appeals held in CPC International, 
Inc. v. McKesson Corp. that there is no implied private right of 
action under the Martin Act.91  ―In all the other States, except 
one, the Legislature has expressly recognized a private civil 
action for violations of the . . . [state‘s securities fraud] 
provision[s].‖92  The Court held that an implied private right of 
action would be against the original purpose of the Act, 
reasoning that ―the legislative scheme underlying the Martin 
Act . . . was to create a statutory mechanism in which the 
Attorney-General would have broad regulatory and remedial 
powers to prevent fraudulent securities practices by 
investigating and intervening at the first indication of possible 
securities fraud on the public . . . .‖93  However, an investor is 
not precluded from basing a claim on common law fraud simply 
because ―the alleged fraudulent conduct is such that the 
Attorney General would be authorized to bring an action 
against the defendant under the Martin Act.‖94  ―[P]rivate 
causes of action sounding in common-law fraud and breach of 
contract may rest upon the same facts that would support a 
Martin Act violation as long as they are sufficient to satisfy 
traditional rules of pleading and proof.‖95 
 
 2.  Possible Avenues of Recourse: A Difficult Task 
 
A blue sky law in almost any other state would give the 
ARS investor a private right of action against his or her 
broker.96  Instead, New York investors must rely on common 
law causes of action such as fraud, misrepresentation, etc. as 
 
91. 514 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1987). 
92. Id. at 118. 
93. Id. at 119. 
94. Kramer v. W10Z/515 Real Estate Ltd., 844 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (App. 
Div. 2007), appeal withdrawn, 896 N.E.2d 96 (N.Y. 2008). 
95. Caboara, 862 N.Y.S.2d at 537. 
96. ―[A] statutory cause of action would be consistent with the blue sky 
laws of the other States which, except for Rhode Island, all expressly provide 
for some form of civil liability.‖  CPC Int’l, 514 N.E.2d at 120. 
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bases for their claims. 
 
a. Common Law Fraud 
 
There are five elements that an investor must prove to 
establish fraud in New York: ―1) [r]epresentations; 2) [f]alsity; 
3) [s]cienter (an intent to make misrepresentations, or reckless 
disregard in making it without knowledge); 4) [d]eception of the 
party to whom made; and 5) [i]njury due to justified reliance on 
the misrepresentation.‖97  The statute of limitations for 
common law fraud is ―the greater of six years from the date the 
cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff 
or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the 
fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.‖98 
As evident by the fraud elements listed above, the investor 
must prove the element of scienter to prevail.  This puts an 
investor at a tremendous disadvantage because proving that a 
broker intended to defraud a customer through the sale of 
securities is difficult.  In fact, the CPC Court encouraged the 
New York State Legislature to ―consider the merits of a 
statutorily expressed cause of action . . . [and to] add a remedy 
for defrauded investors in those cases where none exists in 
common-law fraud.‖99 
 
b. Negligent Misrepresentation 
 
It is possible that an investor could base his or her claim 
on negligent misrepresentation, and argue that the broker was 
 
―[C]areless[ ] in imparting words upon which 
others were expected to rely and upon which they 
 
97. J. KIRKLAND GRANT, SECURITIES ARBITRATION FOR BROKERS, 
ATTORNEYS, AND INVESTORS 185 (1994). 
98. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 2003). 
99. CPC Int’l, 514 N.E.2d at 119-20.  Judge Hancock, who drafted the 
majority opinion, actually disagreed with the rest of the majority in regard to 
what the purpose of the Martin Act was.  Hancock believed that the broader 
purpose of the Act was to deter fraudulent securities practices, which in turn 
would be consistent with implying a private cause of action.  Id. 
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did act or failed to act to their damage,‖ and the 
author must express the information ―directly, 
with knowledge or notice that it will be acted 
upon, to one to whom the author is bound by 
some relation of duty . . . to act with care if he 
acts at all.‖100 
 
As discussed below, a New York resident, as compared to a 
resident of a state that has adopted a blue sky law that 
provides a private right of action, will have much more 
difficulty prevailing in a law suit or arbitration proceeding 
based upon a common law cause of action.  It is unclear why 
the New York legislature has taken this position.  With 
surprisingly little written on this topic, one may only presume 
that it is the result of an intense lobby from Wall Street.  This 
Comment‘s position is that it is not fair to have such an 
extreme disadvantage simply because one resides in the state 
where the financial markets of the world operate. 
 
B. Missouri Securities Act of 2003101 
 
Missouri‘s blue sky laws, contained in the Missouri 
Securities Act of 2003 (―MSA‖), are premised upon the Uniform 
Securities Act of 2002.  Missouri state courts have stated that 
the purpose of the Act is to protect investors.102  ―Fulfillment of 
that statutory purpose ‗embodies a flexible rather than a static 
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the 
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the 
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.‘‖103 
 
100. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The 
Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1007 n.99 
(2002) (quoting White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319 (N.Y. 1977)).  The 
New York Court of Appeals has not yet answered the question of whether an 
investor may claim negligent misrepresentation when faced with a violation 
of the Martin Act.  See Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing cases). 
101. This Comment relies on Missouri as the comparison state because it 
was the first state to adopt the Uniform Securities Act of 2002.  MO. ANN. 
STAT. §§ 409.1-101 to 409.7-703 (West 2009). 
102. State v. Reber, 977 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
103. Id. (citing Garbo v. Hilleary Franchise Sys., 479 S.W.2d 491, 499 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1972)). 
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 1.  Private Right of Action and Statute of Limitations 
 
In addition to the available common law causes of action, 
such as fraud and negligent misrepresentation, the MSA gives 
investors another avenue of recourse.104  The MSA makes it 
unlawful for financial advisors and sellers of securities to 
―make an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, 
not misleading.‖105  It is also unlawful for a financial advisor to 
 
104. The elements for fraud and negligent misrepresentation under 
Missouri common law are essentially the same as in New York, although it 
seems Missouri courts are more willing to allow claims for negligent 
misrepresentation.  The elements for fraud are as follows: 
 
1) a false, material representation; 2) the speaker‘s 
knowledge of its falsity or his ignorance of its truth; 3) the 
speaker‘s intent that it should be acted upon by the hearer 
in the manner reasonably contemplated; 4) the hearer‘s 
ignorance of the falsity of the statement; 5) the hearer‘s 
reliance on its truth; 6) the hearer‘s right to rely thereon; 
and 7) the hearer‘s consequent and proximately caused 
injury. 
 
Reding v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (E.D. Mo. 2005).  
The elements for negligent misrepresentation are as follows: 
 
(1) the speaker supplied information in the course of his or 
her business; (2) due to the speaker‘s failure to exercise 
reasonable care, the information was false; (3) the 
information was intentionally provided for the guidance of a 
limited group of persons in a particular business 
transaction; and (4) in justifiably relying on such 
information, the listener suffered a pecuniary loss. 
 
Gurley v. Montgomery First Nat‘l Bank, 160 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2005). 
105. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 409.5-501. 
 
It is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, 
sale, or purchase of a security, directly or indirectly: (1) To 
employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) To make 
an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statement 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which it is 
made, not misleading; or (3) To engage in an act, practice, or 
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defraud an investor.106  The MSA affords investors a private 
right of action based upon violations of the statute‘s anti-fraud 
provisions.107 
In the case of ARS, the most likely claim an investor would 
make is that the broker made ―an untrue statement of a 
material fact or . . . omit[ted] to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statement made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which it [was] made, not misleading.‖108  
The MSA provides a liability provision, which states in part 
that: 
 
A person is liable to the purchaser if the 
person sells a security . . . by means of an untrue 
statement of a material fact or an omission to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statement made, in light of the 
circumstances under which it is made, not 
misleading . . . .109 
 
 
course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon another person. 
 
Id. 
106. Id. § 409.5-502(a). 
 
It is unlawful for a person that advises others for 
compensation, either directly or indirectly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities 
or that, for compensation and as part of a regular business, 
issues or promulgates analyses or reports relating to 
securities: (1) To employ a device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud another person; or (2) To engage in an act, practice, 
or course of business that operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon another person. 
 
Id. 
107. See generally id. § 409.5-509.  ―The rights and remedies provided by 
this act are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist, but 
this act does not create a cause of action not specified in this section [409.5 – 
509] or section 409.4-411(e).‖  Id. § 409.5-509(m). 
108. Id. § 409.5-501. 
109. Id. § 409.5-509(b). 
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The purchaser, i.e., the investor, of the security has the 
burden of proving that he or she ―did not know and, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, could not have known of the 
untruth or omission.‖110  Notably, there is no provision of the 
MSA that requires the investor to prove that the seller of the 
security had a culpable mental state.  The statute of limitations 
for violations of the MSA‘s provisions regarding material 
misstatements or omissions is ―the earlier of two years after 
discovery of the facts constituting the violation or five years 
after the violation.‖111 
 
 2.  Potential Remedies Under MSA 
 
If successful, recovery may amount to: 
 
[T]he consideration paid for the security, less the 
amount of any income received on the security, 
and interest at the rate of eight percent per year 
from the date of the purchase, costs, and 
reasonable attorneys‘ fees determined by the 
court, upon the tender of the security, or for 
actual damages.112 
 
An investor who ―no longer owns the security may recover 
actual damages . . . [of] the amount that would be recoverable 
upon a tender less the value of the security when the purchaser 
disposed of it, and interest at the rate of eight percent per year 
from the date of the purchase, costs, and reasonable attorneys‘ 
fees determined by the court.‖113 
The MSA also contains a provision for rescission.114  The 
 
110. Id. 
111. Id. § 409.5-509(j)(2). 
112. Id. § 409.5-509(b)(1).  ―Tender requires only notice in a record of 
ownership of the security and willingness to exchange the security for the 
amount specified.‖  Id. § 409.5-509(b)(2). 
113. Id. § 409.5-509(b)(2)-(3). 
114. See generally id. § 409.5-510.  Rescission is 
 
A party‘s unilateral unmaking of a contract for a legally 
sufficient reason, such as the other party‘s material breach, 
or a judgment rescinding the contract . . . [It] is generally 
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seller of the security may, prior to the purchaser filing an 
action, attempt to correct any previous misstatement, or 
omission, that was required to be given under the MSA.115  If 
the basis for the investor‘s potential cause of action is a 
misstatement or omission of a material fact, the seller may 
―offer to repurchase the security for cash, payable on delivery of 
the security, equal to the consideration paid, and interest at 
the rate of eight percent per year from the date of the purchase, 
less the amount of any income received on the security.‖116  The 
seller may also ―offer to pay the purchaser upon acceptance of 
the offer damages in an amount that would be recoverable 
upon a tender, less the value of the security when the 
purchaser disposed of it, and interest at the rate of eight 
percent per year from the date of the purchase in cash‖ if the 
purchaser no longer owns the underlying security.117 
As evidenced by the above discussion of New York‘s Martin 
Act and Missouri‘s blue sky laws, the remedies available to 
investors greatly differ depending on laws of the state in which 
the investor resides.  An investor in one state may have a valid 
and sound claim based upon one set of facts, while that same 
investor with the same claim may have no recourse if he or she 
resided in another state. 
 
IV.  ARS and State Securities Laws 
 
A. Sarah, the Unsophisticated Investor 
 
To demonstrate the devastating effects of New York‘s law 
on investors, this Comment will apply both New York law and 
Missouri law to a hypothetical ARS case.  Assume the 
following: in 2000, Sarah inherited approximately $50,000 from 
her mother‘s estate.  Sarah wanted to make sure that the 
 
available as a remedy or defense for a nondefaulting party 
and is accompanied by restitution of any partial 
performance, thus restoring the parties to their 
precontractual positions . . . .‖ 
 
BLACK‘S, supra note 47, at 1082. 
115. § 409.5-510(1)(A). 
116. Id. § 409.5-510(1)(B). 
117. Id. 
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money was safe, as she was planning to use it at some time in 
the future as a down payment to purchase a home.  She was 
not investment savvy and planned on putting the $50,000 in a 
savings account.  A friend of hers explained that if she put the 
money in a money market account, or a CD, she would be paid 
a higher rate of return than she would in a standard savings 
account. 
Sarah entered her neighborhood brokerage firm in search 
of a CD.  She sat down to speak with Jack, an investment 
advisor and broker.  Jack asked Sarah several questions about 
her investment knowledge and history in order to fill out the 
customer profile sheet that all brokers must complete.  Sarah 
explained the circumstances to Jack: she was working a 
minimum wage job, had no investment experience and wanted 
to use the money as a down payment for a home, but was 
unsure as to when she would be able to qualify for a mortgage. 
Sarah told Jack what she knew about money markets and 
how she had heard from a friend that money markets would 
give her a greater return than her standard savings account 
would.  Jack explained to Sarah that her friend was correct, 
however, he could offer her something even better!  Something 
that was similar to a money market, but that would make her 
even more of a return.  The broker told Sarah that all she 
needed to do when she wanted to get her money was to call him 
and he would have the money for her within seven days.  Sarah 
asked how that was possible, as it sounded too good to be true, 
and Jack enthusiastically stated that ARS were the way to go 
these days. 
Sarah signed the brokerage firm contract (which of course 
had a mandatory arbitration clause built into it) and purchased 
$50,000 worth of ARS holdings at the suggestion of her broker, 
Jack.  Between 2000 and 2007, she made a great return and 
was very satisfied with her investment.  By the end of 2007, 
Sarah finally qualified for a home mortgage.  In February of 
2008, she was ready to purchase her dream house.  Because 
she was still in a lease in her apartment, Sarah signed a 
contract to sublet the apartment to a friend.  The sublet period 
was to begin March 1, 2008 and to last for the remainder of the 
term of the lease.  Sarah called Jack and told him she needed 
access to her $50,000 as she was purchasing her first home the 
following week. 
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Jack informed Sarah that there suddenly was no market 
for ARS and he would not be able to get her the $50,000.  Sarah 
didn‘t understand, she needed her money within the next two 
weeks or else the seller of the home would put it back on the 
market.  Jack apologized and explained that the ARS auctions 
were failing, the market was illiquid and that this was an 
―unprecedented‖ event.  He did, however, offer to loan Sarah 
the $50,000 at an interest rate that was one and a half times 
the rate of return she was collecting from the ARS.  She 
refused the loan. 
February 2008 turned out to be a heartbreaking time for 
Sarah.  She was unable to purchase her dream home and had 
to move out of her apartment due to the subletting contract she 
had signed with her friend.  Sarah had to move into a new 
apartment that cost her double the rent; the old apartment 
only cost $500 per month, whereas now she could not find a 
new apartment for anything less than $1000 per month. 
Sarah called a lawyer for legal advice on March 1, 2008.  
The lawyer informed her that the market for ARS froze and her 
investment was illiquid, meaning that there was no way for her 
to get the $50,000 out of the market.  He also told her that 
there were ongoing investigations into the ARS market by the 
SEC and other securities regulators.  The lawyer explained to 
Sarah that she had several options.  First, she could hold out 
until there was a successful auction.  The lawyer explained 
that if the market fails to become liquid, the ARS that Sarah 
had invested in would not mature for another 25 years.  She 
could not believe this!  There was no way she could wait 25 
years to get her money, she needed it as soon as possible to 
purchase a home.  The second option was to borrow money 
from Jack‘s firm using the ARS as collateral.  Sarah explained 
to her lawyer that Jack had already offered that possibility, but 
she refused to accept the loan because she could not afford to 
pay the interest rate.  The lawyer then told Sarah that her 
final option was to sell the security at a loss on a secondary 
market (if one was available).  She considered this possibility, 
but of course there was no secondary market. 
Sarah was not satisfied with any of the options that were 
before her.  The lawyer advised her to wait and see what the 
outcomes of the securities regulators‘ investigations would 
bring.  In August 2008, she began to hear news of ARS 
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settlements with large brokerage firms such as Citigroup and 
UBS.  Sarah again spoke to the lawyer, who explained to her 
that the settlements at those large firms were not going to help 
her.  The brokerage firm that Sarah had purchased her ARS 
holdings from was considered a ―downstream‖ seller and 
probably would not be forced to settle via the securities 
regulators. 
 
B. What is Sarah to Do? 
 
Sarah is not an ―eligible customer‖ under any of the 
settlements the securities regulators have reached with 
brokerage firms because she had purchased her ARS from a 
downstream seller.  As a result of her being ineligible, Sarah 
does not get the benefit of FINRA‘s special arbitration 
procedures for her consequential damages, i.e., the damages 
she suffered by not being able to purchase a home and in turn, 
being forced to pay double what she had previously paid in 
rent.  The only way for her to potentially recover is if she 
proceeds to arbitration, which is her only available avenue per 
the brokerage contract, but the defendants may contest 
liability as to the illiquidity of her ARS holdings.  Sarah cannot 
base her arbitration claim on a violation of federal securities 
laws or rules because she cannot prove that her broker 
intended to misrepresent the risks associated with ARS since 
even he did not know the true economics behind the ARS 
markets.  Sarah‘s only recourse is to file an arbitration claim 
against her broker under a state securities law. 
 
1. If the Investor is a Resident of New York? 
 
Assume that Sarah is a resident of New York.  She cannot 
premise her cause of action upon the Martin Act because, as 
explained above, there is no implied private right of action for 
violations of the Martin Act.  Now she is left only with common 
law causes of action. 
Should Sarah choose to base her arbitration claim upon 
common law fraud, she will in all likelihood lose the case.  She 
can probably satisfy four of the five fraud elements: she can 
show that there was a representation, that the representation 
was false, that there was deception, and that she justifiably 
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and detrimentally relied upon such false representation.  The 
one element that will be almost impossible for Sarah to satisfy 
is scienter. 
Scienter, under common law fraud in New York, is the 
acting or speaking with the intent to make misrepresentations, 
or reckless disregard in making it without knowledge.118  Sarah 
will be hard-pressed to find any evidence that her broker, Jack, 
intended to make, or with reckless disregard did make, any 
misrepresentations with regard to the ARS.  It is highly 
possible that brokers, especially those like Sarah‘s who worked 
for downstream sellers without access to the issuing firms‘ 
information on ARS, were not aware of the risks associated 
with ARS.  Sarah could perhaps prove that the broker acted 
with reckless disregard by selling a security to her without full 
knowledge of its risks.  However, the downstream sellers and 
brokers likely believed that they were knowledgeable about the 
ARS market at the time they sold the securities.  Historically, 
ARS were good investments and a broker with a decent lawyer 
could argue that the misrepresentations were not recklessly 
made at the time Sarah purchased the ARS.  If brokers did not 
know of the risks and were not reckless when making the 
misrepresentations, investors like Sarah will not satisfy the 
element of scienter, which is necessary to prevail in a common 
law fraud action. 
Sarah may attempt to sue Jack for negligent 
misrepresentation.  She could possibly establish the first 
element of negligent misrepresentation, that Jack was 
―‗careless[ ] in imparting words upon which [she was] expected 
to rely and upon which [she] did act . . . to [her] damage.‘‖119  
Jack told her that ARS were just like money markets, except 
that ARS would make her more of a return.  Sarah also could 
likely prove that Jack ―express[ed] the information ‗directly, 
with knowledge or notice that it [would] be acted upon, to one 
to whom the author is bound by some relation of duty. . . to act 
with care if he acts at all.‘‖120  Jack did know that Sarah was 
 
118. See GRANT, supra note 97, at 185. 
119. Black & Gross, supra note 100, at 1007 n.99 (quoting White v. 
Guarente, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319 (N.Y. 1977)). 
120. Id. (quoting White, 372 N.E.2d at 319).  The New York Court of 
Appeals has not yet answered the question of whether an investor may claim 
negligent misrepresentation when faced with a violation of the Martin Act.  
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going to rely on his recommendation; she had no prior 
investment experience and was, for all intents and purposes, 
an entirely unsophisticated investor.  Because he was Sarah‘s 
broker, Jack owed her certain fiduciary duties.  Although she 
may be able to successfully bring a claim for negligent 
misrepresentation, the trial and intermediate level courts in 
New York are split as to whether investors may sue for 
negligent misrepresentation based upon a violation of the 
Martin Act.  The New York Court of Appeals has not yet 
addressed this issue, making a successful cause of action under 
this theory questionable at best. 
 
2. If the Investor is a Resident of Missouri? 
 
Now assume that Sarah is a resident of Missouri, which 
means that in arbitration, she can take advantage of the MSA.  
The MSA provides for a private right of action based upon a 
violation of the MSA itself; therefore Sarah need not worry that 
she will not be successful based upon common law causes of 
action.  Under MSA Section 409.5-501, Sarah‘s strongest claim 
is that her broker, Jack, made ―an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omit[ted] to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statement made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which it is made, not misleading.‖121 
Under the MSA, it is irrelevant that Jack may not have 
known of all risks associated with ARS.  Sarah can rely on the 
MSA liability provisions that hold the seller of the security 
liable for ―sell[ing] a security . . . by means of an untrue 
statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of 
the circumstances under which it is made, not misleading.‖122  
Sarah then must satisfy the burden of proving that she ―did not 
know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have 
known of the untruth or omission‖ at the time she purchased 
the ARS.123  Surely she could prove that she did not know that 
Jack was not telling her all of the relevant facts related to ARS.  
 
See Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
121. § 409.5-501(2). 
122. Id. § 409.5-509(b). 
123. Id. 
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Sarah knew nothing about investments of any kind.  Even if 
she had exercised reasonable care by conducting additional 
research regarding ARS, there was no public information that 
would have led Sarah to speculate that the markets were being 
supported by large brokerage firms and that there was a 
chance that the markets may freeze once those firms stopped 
supplying supporting bids.  Sarah will likely win her claim 
based upon the MSA. 
If Sarah is successful based upon her underlying claim, she 
is entitled to receive the amount she paid for the investment—
here, $50,000—less any income she received from it.124  She 
may also receive eight percent interest on the recoverable 
amount and may be reimbursed for her costs and reasonable 
attorneys‘ fees that she incurred as a result of pursuing her 
claim.125  It is entirely possible that the broker would be willing 
to offer to rescind the contract Sarah signed, meaning that the 
broker would repurchase the ARS from her for the amount she 
paid for it, less the income she received, plus interest of eight 
percent.126 
 
C. The Blessings of a Statutory Private Right of Action 
 
As a result of the above hypothetical, it is evident that 
Sarah would fare much better as a resident of Missouri.  If she 
were a resident of New York, she would likely recover nothing 
in arbitration.127  The opposite is true if she were a resident of 
 
124. Id. § 409.5-509(b)(1). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. § 409.5-510. 
127. While there is the possibility that Sarah could prevail on a 
negligent misrepresentation claim, it is unlikely that a New York court would 
overturn an arbitration decision, as the grounds for doing so are limited. 
 
1. The award shall be vacated on the application of a 
party who either participated in the arbitration or was 
served with a notice of intention to arbitrate if the court 
finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by: (i) 
corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or 
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except 
where the award was by confession; or (iii) an arbitrator, or 
agency or person making the award exceeded his power or 
so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award 
upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or (iv) 
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Missouri.  There, Sarah would recover everything: her 
investment (less income she received) plus interest, reasonable 
attorneys‘ fees, and the possibility of rescission.  The only parts 
of Sarah‘s loss that may not be recoverable are her 
consequential damages, e.g., her increased rent.  The MSA 
makes no mention of consequential damages and it is 
questionable whether the arbitrator would allow Sarah to 
recover those if they are not expressly allowed in the statute. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
ARS are only one form of investment that took the market, 
and probably the world, by surprise with their devastating 
effects.  In the future, there will be other securities that will do 
the same.  While federal and state regulatory authorities have 
securities laws that they use in their attempts to remedy the 
harm created by such investments, it is impossible for those 
regulators to be involved every time a broker makes a 
misrepresentation to an investor regarding a certain type of 
investment.  When regulators are not involved, investors are on 
their own. 
State legislatures around the country have adopted, in 
some fashion, the Uniform Securities Act.  This Comment 
urges New York‘s legislature to do the same.  For New York 
investors to be at such an extreme disadvantage in a suit, or 
arbitration claim, against their brokers—simply because of 
their state of residence—is extremely unfair and burdensome.  
Why should New York investors suffer and, in the case of ARS, 
almost surely fail, in their attempts to remedy the wrongs their 
brokers and brokerage firms have committed against them?  
ARS may be an exaggerated example of how damaging the 
effects of broker misconduct can be, but the same effects are 
felt every day by New York investors who have little to no 
recourse due to the State‘s legislature and its failure to provide 
them with a remedy. 
 
failure to follow the procedure of this article, unless the 
party applying to vacate the award continued with the 
arbitration with notice of the defect and without objection. 
 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b) (McKinney 1998). 
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The purpose of this Comment is to urge the New York 
State legislature to adopt a version of the Uniform Securities 
Act.  The legislature could do so without hindering the power 
given to the Attorney General in the Martin Act.  A New York 
statute that authorizes a private right of action based upon 
violations of the Martin Act would grant New York investors 
the many benefits that investors in almost all other states 
receive. 
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